Multiculturalism contra Ethnicity: the case of Cyprus

In late June, I will be presenting a paper titled ‘Multiculturalism contra Ethnicity: the case of Cyprus’ at a conference organised by Surrey’s Center of Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism and UCL’s Migration Research Unit, called The Future of Multiculturalism: Structures, Integration Policies and Practices.

This is the abstract of my paper:

This paper will use the post-conflict and post-colonial multicultural challenges that exist in Cyprus to assess the use of ethnicity as a marker for cultural identification. It will be demonstrated that ethnocultural identification can become a source of social, political and linguistic oppression and as such should not be uncritically adopted in defence of group-differentiated citizenship. This hypothesis will be assessed through the example of Cyprus, where the British colonialists divided the various religious groups of the island into two ethno-national minorities, reducing the rest into religious collectives without substantial political rights. The case of Cyprus will demonstrate: (i) how the concept of ethnicity as an ‘imagined community’ can be utilised as a pretext for assimilation or social isolation; (ii) how ethnicity prioritises the continuation of the collective imaginary values over than the needs of the individual cultural members; and (iii) how ethnicity can be utilised in making religious groups socially invisible. The marginalisation of the Maronite, Latin, Armenian and Roma cultures in Cyprus demonstrates the problematic relation of ethnicity and multiculturalism since the former can be used to deny cultural and linguistic recognition to non-dominant or non-ethnic minorities and religious groups.

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Modood's Multiculturalism: a Civic Idea

Opposite the critiques of group-rights, stands Tariq Modood who is one of the most vocal proponents of multiculturalism in the UK. His book Multiculturalism: a Civic Idea (2007) is a reply to the conservative claims that multiculturalism is dead, like those advanced by the British Prime Minister David Cameron when discussing terrorism and radicalisation (05 February 2011).

Modood agrees with Kymlicka that ‘the strict separation of state and ethnicity is incoherent’ (Kymlicka 2001) but condemns his preferential treatment of national minorities at the expense of religious groups and voluntary immigrants. In doing so, Modood argues, Kymlicka considers that ‘liberal neutrality in relation to religion is correct and unproblematic’ (p. 36). Therefore, Kymlicka’s theory suffers both from secularist bias and from multinational bias (p. 34).

Modood proposes a conception of culture that is based on difference, both internal and external. Cultures need not be considered a coherent whole he argues, since a collective entity can exist, without essentialised notions of membership and definition (p. 97). Cultures based on religions, should be seen as any other identity group, and indeed use similar rhetoric as gay, feminist or racial groups (p. 70). Therefore, multicultural equality ‘when applied to religious groups means that secularism simpliciter appears to be an obstacle to integration and equality’ (p. 78) and religions need to be recognised in the public sphere.

Modood is based on Wittegenstein’s concept of multi family resemblance to define what a culture is through five levels of analysis: firstly, there are differences within and amongst groups; secondly, these differences are based on social identities like race and religion; thirdly, each group considers itself to be a group in different ways; fourthly, each group has different priorities; and fifthly, all previous aspects will vary among the members of each group (p. 119).

Therefore, it does not make sense to reduce a religious group to a simplistic and overgeneralised set of attributes, like it happened with Muslims after the terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2005 in New York and London respectively, whose religious identity became equated with religious fundamentalism. As Modood argues, ‘the government having created the political extremism through its foreign policies, by blaming multiculturalism and the Muslim communities for the crisis, is losing the one sure resource that is necessary for a long-term victory over domestic terrorism: namely, the full and active on-side cooperation of the Muslim communities’ (p. 139).

What makes Modood’s contribution useful is firstly his definition of the culture that I have outlined above and secondly, his account of recognition through participation. Civil society, he argues, should bear some of the costs of recognition, where ‘religious discourses’ can be ‘legitimate civic discourses’ since ‘religious leaders are legitimate civic leaders’ (p. 136). Religious leaders according to Modood are indeed legitimate only if they are chosen and recognised as such by their respective communities. By allowing room for religion in the public sphere, Modood calls for a more inclusive national identity, which will be based on discussion and deliberation rather than on a fixed set of values who can either be ‘too bland or too divisive’ (p. 152).

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Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship

In this post, I provide a summary of Will Kymlicka’s very influential book on multiculturalism, titled Multicultural Citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights. This book is important for everyone interested in multiculturalism since it initiated the contemporary debate about group-differentiated rights. One needs not to fully agree with Kymlicka to acknowledge his courageous effort to challenge liberalism’s atomistic individualism by promoting an interpretation of traditional liberal values which demands special treatment to members of some (minorities and immigrant) groups. In doing so, Kymlicka challenges the long assumed neutrality of the liberal state. His thinking and argumentation comes within liberalism itself, which is what makes his case distinctive (if anyone dares to give a concrete definition of liberalism, be my guest).

There are of course fundamental aspects of his book that I find troubling: firstly, his treatment of culture as a more or less homogenous entity; secondly, the clear cut division of national minorities and immigrant groups; thirdly, the use of ethnicity as the marker for cultural identity which is often advanced at the expense of other identities; and finally, his comprehensive liberal approach to autonomy being the ultimate value that the state needs to safeguard.

As this is not a review but rather a summary of the book, my personal opinion will be put on hold for a future post. In what follows, I will try to illustrate Kymlicka’s arguments. Let us begin.

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Multiculturalism and Women's Agency

A couple of days ago, at a roundtable, the discussion of Female Genital Cutting came up, and I remembered that I’ve written this piece about women and agency some time ago, but I didn’t publish it in the blog. I hope that you find it interesting.

Introduction

If a woman says she is happy with the practices of her culture, whatever these might be, we should not immediately assume that she is not, neither should we assume that she lacks the capacity to assess her condition.

The discourse of ‘oppressive practices’ is shaped around matters of veiling, female genital cutting and forced marriages and are either considered culturally-specific and hence a product of multiculturalism, or cross-cultural and therefore as something that ‘we’ should deal with collectively, which often means imposing external limits on minority cultures.

My overall argument in this essay will be that we cannot formulate a cross-cultural list of ‘oppressive practices’ that ought to be banned. What matters, is not whether the western middle-class white feminists approve of the practices of minority cultures but rather whether the members of these cultures, within the social context and historical contingency that is their culture, have the necessary agency to decide for themselves.

In the following parts, I will firstly assess the problematic understanding of culture as something static and homogenous. I will propose that in order to engage in intercultural discussion, liberal feminism needs to abandon its superior attitude of being “a salvage operation if not salvation itself”.1 Secondly, I will argue that western commentators need to acknowledge that everyone is affected by cultural norms and everyone is a cultural agent. Therefore, agency should not be considered as something that one has or has not, but as something that can be empowered.2
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Tully's Strange Multiplicity

I give a summary of what I consider to be one of the greatest works of contemporary political philosophy.

Tully, in his book Strange Multiplicity (1995) gives an account of what a just constitution would look like. In a just constitution he tells us ‘each speaker is given her or his due, and this is exactly the initial question raised by the politics of cultural recognition’ (p. 6). A just constitution arises through deliberation among equals; people who mutually recognise each other for what they are without reducing them to familiar and convenient images that distort and misrepresent them. This requirement (of diversity) has been ignored in the discussion of multiculturalism, since ‘cultures are conceived as analogous to the more familiar constitutional concept of nations’ (p. 8). Moreover, multiculturalism has been a victim of essentialism; cultures are discussed as if they are internally homogenous entities, even though in reality they are ‘continuously contested, imagined and reimagined, transformed and negotiated, both by their members and through their interactions with others’ (p. 11).

Tully suggests that we need to listen to the stories that other people have to tell us through intercultural dialogue that will facilitate our understanding of other peoples’ diverse perspectives. This intercultural discussion has not taken place at the constitutional level, and therefore the modern constitution remains undemocratic (p. 28-9).
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Ethnic Nationalism

“The notion that birth is fate – that simply in virtue of being born into a certain ethnic group one acquires the (potentially enforceable) duty to maintain its ancestral culture – is continuous with a kind of ethnic nationalism that is potentially at odds with liberalism.” Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 65.

I disagree with most of Barry’s points, but I do share his worries (end envy his writing style).

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..where we're coming from

Consider what we mean by identity. It is who we are, ‘where we’re coming from’. As such it is the background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense. If some of the things I value most are accessible to me only in relation to the person I love, then she becomes part of my own identity.

(by Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition)

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